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SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING: THE
ABILITY TO DECIDE AND THE DUTY TO
EXPLAINt
by Norman Davidson, HPJ*
Traditional wisdom about the judicial process held that the function
of the courts was to apply rather than to change the law. The notion
that courts legislate was considered an apostasy entertained by those
who gravely confused the proper role of the courts with that of the
legislature.1 While it may now be safe to say that the categorical view
that courts should never legislate is moribund,2 an equally limited, if
more sophisticated, view of the judicial process dominates contempo-
rary thinking about the judicial system.
According to traditional wisdom, the essential feature of the judicial
system, for purposes of understanding and defining its legislative limits,
is its interstitial nature.' Characterizing the judicial process as intersti-
t This article is dedicated to the friendship and careful decision making of Judge Albert
Lee Stephens, Jr., Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, for whom I had the honor of clerking.
* B.A., 1969 (Yale University); J.D., 1972 (University of Virginia). Member, State Bar of
California.
1. M.R. Cohen explained:
Whether because of the general overturning of ordinary interests brought about by the
World War, or for some other reason, the controversy over the recall of judges and
judicial decisions that raged some years ago seems to have disappeared. The leaders of
the American bar claim to have settled the matter by a campaign of education. The
keynote of the campaign was sounded by Elihu Root when he urged that the public be
educated to an appreciation of the true function of the judge, which he expressed as
follows: "It is not his function or within his power to enlarge or improve or change the
law." In Sharswbod's "Essay on Professional Ethics," republished by the American Bar
Association, judicial legislation is one cardinal sin of which jurists must beware.
Cohen, The Process of Judicial Legislation, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 450-51 (1951).
2. M.R. Cohen pointed out the fallacy of contending that courts simply apply the law
rather than change the law:
In spite, however, of the apparent authority back of this theory, a philosopher need
not hesitate to declare it demonstrably false, ie., contrary to fact. If judges never make
any laws, how could the body of rules known as the common law ever have arisen, or
have undergone the changes which it has?
Cohen, The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REV. 161, 162 (1914).
3. One of the first, and perhaps most famous, uses of the word interstitial was by Mr.
Justice Holmes:
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
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tial draws attention to the fact that judicial decision making takes place
in the context of a dispute between parties to be decided by reference to
applicable statutes and existing case law. The adversary context is
viewed as necessarily limiting courts' ability to pick the issues to be
decided and the time for their decision. A comprehensive considera-
tion of all relevant information, as well as an airing of all interested
views, is seen as impossible in the context of the single case. This in-
ability to be comprehensive is seen as fundamentally undermining the
capacity of the courts to deal with complex public problems.
The mirror image of arguments stressing the inability of judicial de-
cision making to cope with complex public problems are arguments
emphasizing the superior capability of the legislature to deal with such
problems.4 That legislative superiority is said to be based upon better
access to expert opinion, greater investigative and research capability,
the ability to hear a broader range of relevant testimony, and a better
understanding of what the public will accept and how the proposed
action will affect decision making in related areas.5
What underlies the view that courts are not suited to decide complex
questions of public policy, and the companion perception that the legis-
lature is unquestionably better adapted for such problem solving, are
assumptions about how problems are solved.6 Perhaps the most funda-
mental of these assumptions is that defensible and "rational" decision
making is decision making undertaken in light of a comprehensive con-
sideration of pertinent information, different points of view, alternative
courses of action, and the possible consequences of each alternative.
7
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge
could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall
not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of
admiralty say I think well of the common-law rules of master and servant and propose
to introduce them here en bloc. Certainly he could not in that way enlarge the exclusive
jurisdiction of the District Courts and cut down the power of the States. If admiralty
adopts common-law rules without an act of Congress it cannot extend the maritime law
as understood by the Constitution. It must take the rights of the parties from a different
authority, just as it does when it enforces a lien created by a state.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 1005-18 (1975).
5. Id. at 1013.
6. The way in which we view the capabilities and limitations of the judicial process re-
flects fundamental assumptions about what we are capable of knowing. It is the thesis of
this article that adverting to and examining these basic assumptions about the epistemology
of problem solving is an indispensable inquiry in understanding the limitations and capabil-
ities of Supreme Court decision making.
7. See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 37-41 (1967) [herein-
after cited as LINDBLOM]. Lindblom seeks to isolate techniques used by social scientists
which are designed to take into account the manifold difficulties in problem solving that
[Vol. 12
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Given this assumption, adjudication, limited as it is to a single case or
controversy, necessarily fails.
Whenever the Supreme Court decides a question which carries im-
plications far beyond the case at bar, not only is the Court's ability to
decide such issues thrown into question, but in addition, the Court's
right to so decide is challenged. Those advocating a limited judicial
decision making role demand an answer to the troubling question of
what justifies the least democratic body---"nine old men" appointed for
life, responsible to none-in deciding questions of fundamental social
importance about which there is intense conflict.8
Those advocating an active role for the Court in deciding complex
questions of public policy must therefore address themselves to the po-
tent argument that, both from the standpoint of what is required to
solve such problems and from the standpoint of who ought to decide
deeply-felt and contested questions of public policy, the legislative
process is unquestionably better able to produce acceptable results.
This argument underlies increasingly vociferous criticisms of the Court
which have undermined public confidence in judicial solutions to com-
plex public problems. 9
beset decision makers. Taken together, these techniques constitute a strategy of evaluation
which is effective in overcoming difficulties which are characteristic of complex problems of
public policy. As will become apparent, this article draws on Lindblom's conception of what
effective problem solving requires. It is not necessary to accept completely Lindblom's con-
demnation of other modes of solving problems to see that he makes a compelling case that
the strategy of evaluation set forth is well adapted to cope with the fundamental problems
associated with complex social problems.
8. While it is clear who decides, the question of what gives them the right has never been
satisfactorily answered. Absent a constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional interpretations are both authoritative and final. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). The authority most frequently invoked is Chief Justice Marshall's fa-
mous statement that [I]t is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." Id. at 177. With respect to the troublesome nature of the theoretical
justification for judicial review, see Bishin, JudicialReview in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1099 (1977).
9. A recent essay in Time Magazine seems typical of current criticisms of the Court:
The fear, as Constitutional Scholar Alexander Bickel once expressed it, is that too many
federal judges view themselves as holding "roving commissions as problem solvers,
charged with a duty to act when majoritarian institutions do not."
... When Boston's duly elected school committee refused to bus school children, the
local federal judge did it himself, right down to approving the bus routes. A federal
judge in Alabama ruled that inadequate mental-health care is unconstitutional. So
what is adequate? His answer was a list of 84 minimal standards. ...
... To clean up state prisons, judges in Alabama, Rhode Island, Oklahoma and
Louisiana have decreed elaborate instructions on food handling, hospital operations,
recreation facilities, sanitation, laundry, painting and plumbing, including the number
of inmates per toilet.
Thomas, TIME, January 22, 1979, at 91, 91 (Essay) (quoting Alexander Bickel).
Even the most vociferous of critics rarely suggest that the judiciary is completely without
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This article seeks to explain what it is about the judicial process
which justifies the Supreme Court in deciding complex questions of
public policy. Its aim is not to suggest that the judiciary is better able
to decide such issues than is the legislature, but rather, to demonstrate
that the judicial system has a potentially unique and invaluable contri-
bution to make to their solution provided that certain demands are met.
Once this is grasped, the question of whether or not the Court's deci-
sion was justified in a particular case can be better asked and an-
swered.' 0
I. THE ABILITY TO DECIDE
Men and women making decisions must constantly deal with certain
vexing aspects of problems and problem-solving situations. Compre-
hensiveness as a goal for any particular decision is unattainable. I
Limits on one's intellectual capacity, knowledge, time, and resources
dictate that choice must be exercised long before all possible or even
relevant courses of action are evaluated."2 Often there is either too
much or too little information.' 3 The issues which must be confronted
multiply as attention shifts among competing values and different
facts.'4 In addition, there is often a multiplicity of different points of
view which change with time and experience.
15
Public policy problems must therefore be simplified in order to be
decided.16 Ways must be found to select which aspects of a given prob-
lem to focus upon and which aspects to abandon. Because that very
simplification necessarily excludes important values and pertinent
authority in areas such as school desegregation. "Few would ask the judges to undo all the
rights they have advanced in the past 25 years." Id. at 92. The most common criticism is
simply that "the judges have gone too far." Id But cf R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY (1977) (challenging the Court's right to decide certain issues as it has under the au-
thor's construction of the Constitution).
10. Standards by which to judge Supreme Court decision making have been developed by
focusing upon the importance of general adjudicatory principles that are neutral in charac-
ter. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959). The political and institutional role of the Court in relation to other institutions has
also been a focal point for the development of standards. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1969); M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964);
Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term Foreword- Toward a Model ofRoles in the Due Process
of Lfe and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973).
11. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 39.
12. See, e.g., id. at 48, 113.
13. Id. at 50-51.
14. Id. at 48-49.
15. Id. at 26-29.
16. Id. at 48-49.
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facts, a method must be provided for remedying that omission at a later
time. There must be an opportunity to act again if a decision is in
error. 17
Public policy decisions must also be continuously reexamined be-
cause experience, in the wake of a decision, generates new information,
new things to value and new reasons for valuing them.' Reexamina-
tion is also necessary because of the interplay between ends and means.
Although the conventional view of problem solving is that means are
adjusted to ends, in practice the reverse often occurs. Objectives which
are currently sought must be constantly redefined in light of what expe-
rience demonstrates is desirable and possible. There is never a point at
which one can "turn off' evaluation.' 9
Public policy problems also present the difficulty of identifying what
points of view are really in conflict and to what degree. Defensible
choice must then be exercised among what are often hotly-contested
points of view. To the extent possible, ideological conffict over issues
not really in question must be avoided.
Because these problems are repeatedly faced by those dealing with
complex issues, people have in fact devised ways of solving them. A
"strategy" has emerged, the general characteristics of which are cap-
tured in the following passage:
[T]he problem of evaluation is simplified by a concentration on social
evils rather than on utopias .... [L]imits on man's competence are ac-
knowledged in reforms that alter only relatively small parts of the social
structure at any one time .... [Continuity and readjustment diminishes
the need to be right in any single decision .... [A]ims change with expe-
rience [and] with policies; and ... experiments in social reform teach
some things that cannot be learned in any other way.
20
As the following discussion will illustrate, the judicial process shares
the characteristics of this strategy as well as possessing other features.
Thus, it has the capacity to be an effective process for deciding complex
questions of far-reaching social impact."
A strategy of decision able to cope with many changing values, the
interplay between ends and means, the need for continuous reevalua-
tion of purpose in light of experience, the difficulty of predicting the
consequences of any given action in a complex setting, and limitations
17. See id. at 48, 55.
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id. at 52-57.
20. Id. at 82 (discussing 1 K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 139-44
(1945)).
21. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 107. See also id. at 81.
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upon human knowledge, time, and resources, proceeds incrementally:
that is to say, in small steps.22 Each step becomes a repository of infor-
mation for exploring the propriety of succeeding steps. Each step be-
comes a touchstone for moral, psychological, and societal response to
social ordering. While each step can be the beginning of big or funda-
mental change, it is not so large that it cannot be remedied by a subse-
quent step.23
Such a step in the legal system is, of course, the decided case. A case
resolves a dispute between real parties. It thereby presses abstract val-
ues into decisions between available remedies. This very concreteness
allows us to ask how much of one value we are willing to give up to
achieve more of another value.2" Each case throws prior experience
and traditional wisdom into a confrontation with contemporary experi-
ence and understanding.
A second characteristic of decision making which is well adapted to
coping with complex public problems is that solutions appear in a se-
ries of steps presenting continuing opportunities to act again.25 The
difficult problems which confront us are not solved by any one deci-
sion; solutions come from processes which repeatedly attack such
problems in light of what past decisions have demonstrated to be possi-
ble and desirable.26 There must be the recurring opportunity to act
again on the basis of expanded understanding without having to
redecide that which past experience has laid to rest.27
Continuous decision making is one of the essential features of the
judicial system. Each case is subjected to the scrutiny of subsequent
cases. While courts must finally decide disputes between the particular
22. Id. at 111-17.
23. See id. at 83-88, 107, 121. The primary virtue which Lindblom assigns to accomplish-
ing fundamental change by small steps is that it takes into account the difficulty of predict-
ing the consequences of any given decision. The more cataclysmic the change accomplished
by a single decision, the more limited our understanding of its consequences becomes. In
addition, simplification is achieved by comparing alternatives, all of which are similar to the
status quo. A dominant characteristic of problem solving which successfully deals with too
little or too much information is that it holds attention to the familiar and focuses upon the
ways in which the situation that might result from alternative policies differs from the status
quo. See, e.g., id. at 121.
24. Id. at 85, 88, 96, 98. See generalo id. at 17-18.
25. Lindblom terms this feature "serial." A serial attack recognizes that progress is made
by continuous exploration rather than by one comprehensive solution. Unending chains of
responses, in which past moves are found wanting and new moves advance, take advantage
of our limited capacity to understand and solve vexing social problems while refusing to
succumb to them. Id. at 99-100.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 52-57.
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litigants at bar, courts do not finally resolve the issues presented by
those disputes. The complex problems of social ordering which form
the backdrop for disputes are explored and attacked by succeeding de-
cisions. Not only are problems the object of unending chains of de-
cided cases, but each decision is made in light of experience with prior
decisions in similar contexts. The doctrine of stare decisis, and the very
nature of decision making by use of precedent, require the considera-
tion of the success or failure of past decisions in similar cases. When
the judicial system does produce a patchwork of decisions at odds with
each other, as in the case of circuit conflict, it is usually because of
genuine disagreement and not because of ignorance of prior judicial
experience in similar cases. As discussed below,28 this kind of dis-
agreement is a source of innovative approaches, and is, itself, a central
characteristic of decision making adapted to solving complex public
problems.
The impossibility of being comprehensive in the sense of exploring
all possible or even relevant means and ends, the multiplicity of chang-
ing values, and limitations on human comprehension, time and re-
sources, dictate that adaptive decision making will tend to move away
from social ills rather than toward a fixed objective. This "remedial"
characteristic reflects the necessity of suppressing vice as it is currently
understood even though virtue may be difficult to define.2 9
The legal system possesses precisely this characteristic of remedying
injuries experienced as ills in the community. The remedial process
operates by proceeding in corrective steps which explore the depth of
human sentiment and the societal cost attendant to a felt wrong. 30 This
does not mean the solutions emerging are incomplete or noncom-
prehensive. The development of products liability is one of many ex-
amples of how individual case solutions to isolated wrongs are
marshalled by case law and precedent to produce a coherent pattern of
solutions.3' Likewise, the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in
28. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
29. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 82, 102-04.
30. Compare, for example, the policies articulated in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) with the revised policy considera-
tions of the California Supreme Court 5 years later in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (overruling Amaya).
31. In California, for instance, the parameters of the products liability cause of action
have emerged only as the need for definition has appeared in the cases. See, e.g., Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 23 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (establishing
basic cause of action against manufacturer by user of product); Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (extending cause of action to
retailer defendant); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
1979]
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Brown v. Board of Education,32 which eradicated the separate but equal
doctrine, is still undergoing the process of definition33 in light of the
numerous contexts in which discrimination continues to surface and in
light of the struggle to remedy past discrimination.
Defensible decision making must be able to produce new and better
responses and approaches: there must be the capability to innovate.
The ability of an organization to be creative or resourceful is closely
associated with its ability to recombine units of information into new
patterns. The ability to innovate is related to the "combinatorial" rich-
ness of the system by which information is stored, processed and evalu-
ated.34 Viewed from this perspective, the legal system possesses an
enormous capacity to produce creative solutions. Because the Court
makes its decision in the context of competing lines of authority, re-
combination is necessarily an integral part of the judicial process. The
ever expanding system of precedent presents an unlimited yet manage-
able source of combinational richness.35
The capacity of the judicial system to innovate is also related to the
fact that different courts adjudicate similar disputes, use the same prec-
(1965) (extending cause of action to wholesaler defendant); Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (extending standing to third
party bystanders who are not users of product); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466
P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (extending cause of action to lessor of property as defend-
ant when no sale had occurred).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. See, e.g., University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) (decided on non-
constitutional grounds); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34. LINDBLOM, .supra note 7, at 98-99. Pioneering work by Karl Deutsch applied the
viewpoint of cybernetics to questions of fundamental importance including the nature of
innovation. Cybernetics presupposes that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental
characteristics and every organization is glued together by communication. Communica-
tion, the ability to transmit messages and react to them, makes organizations. This is true
for a living cell, a computer and an organization of thinking men and women in a social
group. Recombination of units of information appears to be closely related to the ability to
innovate:
[Tlhe ability of any political decision system to invent and carry out fundamentally new
policies to meet new conditions is clearly related to its ability to combine items of infor-
mation into new patterns, so as to find new solutions that may be improbable in terms
of their likelihood of being discovered, but relevant once they are discovered and ap-
plied.
K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT 163 (1963).
35. Long before cybernetics or incrementalism, Mr. Justice Cardozo powerfully expressed
the enormous capacity of the judicial process to give birth to creative changes:
The changes, as they were made in this case or that, may not have seemed momentous
in the making. The result, however, when the process was prolonged throughout the
years, has been not merely to supplement or modify; it has been to revolutionize and
transform. . . . Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable.
There is an endless "becoming."
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27-28 (1921).
[Vol. 12
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
edential history and arrive at different conclusions. Just as a court may
analyze information and values neglected in prior decisions by other
courts, it may also simply consider the approaches of other courts to be
wrong. Two courts may reach different conclusions, though each con-
siders the same case precedents, and though the disputes under adjudi-
cation arise from strikingly similar factual situations. The viewpoints
and approaches reflected in such differences are invaluable sources of
judicial innovation.36 Thus, in the federal system, the United States
district courts recombine lines of competing precedent, often arriving at
different decisions; the circuit court of appeals is faced with the diverg-
ing lower court decisions as well as with the same competing lines of
precedent. The Supreme Court, frequently finding the circuits in con-
flict, reviews this entire precedential history and arrives at the final re-
combination.
Decisions involving hotly-contested public problems must be made
with an understanding of what the fight is about. A decision making
process which can deal effectively with complex public problems must
be able to identify what values are really at stake in a given dispute.
Precision in identification of the issues will facilitate avoidance of need-
less conflicts. Yet, we often do not know what our values are until a
concrete choice is presented in which we can focus in specific terms
upon how much of one value we are willing to give up in order to
obtain more of another value.37
The fact that judicial decision making takes place in the context of a
concrete dispute forces objectives to be understood and adjusted in
terms of the impact of the relief on the parties at bar. Moreover, the
remedial, continuous and exploratory nature of judicial decision mak-
ing presents numerous opportunities for some agreement to be reached,
even among members of opposing ideological camps. The very con-
creteness of disputes which give rise to court decisions to a large extent
avoids conflict along ideological lines. On the other hand, that conflict
is often exacerbated when issues are debated or attempted to be re-
solved in the context of finally deciding issues of ultimate principle. 8
Because court decisions are remedial and must resolve a specific dis-
pute, they take advantage of the frequency with which we find our-
selves agreeing on what we are against, even though we cannot always
agree on what we are for. In other words, consensus is promoted by
decision making which must choose between available remedies in the
36. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 104-06, 127.
37. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
38. LINDBLOM, supra note 7, at 123.
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context of an actual dispute. Provocations are avoided on an enormous
range of politically irrelevant issues. Agreement can often be reached
on alternative policies, regardless of disagreement on ultimate values.
Paradoxically, the very characteristic of the federal judiciary which is
seen as limiting the Court's decision making role, the fact that federal
courts may decide only "cases" or "controversies," 39 is one of the cen-
tral adaptations for deciding complex problems. The presence of a
concrete dispute affords a way of limiting information so as to make it
manageable. It also presses abstract values into choices between realis-
tic alternatives. This helps us to identify how much of certain values
are really being given up to obtain other values. Similarly, the charac-
teristic of complex problems which is said to eliminate the courts as
legitimate makers of public policy, the difficulty of knowing the conse-
quences of any given action when numerous variables are present, is
accommodated by the continuous and remedial nature of judicial deci-
sion making.
This article has attempted to demonstrate up to this point that the
judicial process is uniquely adapted for devising solutions to complex
public problems. However, inevitable questions remain. How can this
ability of the judicial process be squared with certain basic assumptions
about the role of the courts? When is a question properly referred to
the legislature for decision? When should the Supreme Court overrule
precedent in a setting involving complex public policy considerations
and conflicting values? An examination of some common notions
about stare decisis and the role of courts may be helpful in determining
answers to these questions.
II. THE DUTY TO EXPLAIN
It is a common belief that the law should furnish a clear guide for the
conduct of individuals so that they may plan their affairs with reason-
able assurance against surprise. People usually conduct their affairs on
the assumption that past doctrines will be maintained. Yet, judicial
decision making, which is, by definition, retroactive, will most fre-
quently adjudicate controversies that arose yesterday. Thus, when it is
necessary to make a break with the past, to overturn past precedent and
set down new rules of public policy, should not this task be left to the
legislature which is under a constitutional mandate to act prospec-
tively?40 This analysis, however, fails to account for some of the essen-
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. Eg., id. art. I, § 9 (prohibition against ex post facto laws).
[Vol. 12
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
tial features of judicial decision making. The judicial process, by its
very nature, proceeds in small steps, constantly probing the future by
recombining units of information into new patterns and new decisions.
While the end result might be a revolutionary new development, the
means are a series of small, incremental steps. 41 This very process of
serial change, then, gives notice of new directions. Indeed, the dicta of
a case may frequently serve the function of a weather vane to those
who are interested in which way the winds are blowing. In addition,
prospective overruling can act in substantial mitigation of judicial
change. The Supreme Court must ask itself whether expectations have
been created by past decisions, whether there was, in fact, reliance, and
if so, whether it was justifiable in light of the past decisions.
That like cases ought to be treated alike is a basic moral principle of
our legal system.42 This fundamental belief springs from the necessity
of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary as a source of equal
treatment and disinterested and reasoned judgment. As Max Radin
has pointed out, however, it may be just as difficult to follow the wind-
ing path of precedent as it is to overrule precedent.43 In formulating
the rule of a case in its own factual context, the judge must seek some
level of generalization if the principle enunciated is to have future util-
ity. Courts necessarily expand or contract the rule by bringing other
cases, with their own factual settings, within the previous generaliza-
tion. At a certain level of generalization they have, in fact, formulated
an entirely new principle.
The notion of incremental change recognizes that society is in flux.
In fact, almost every case that reaches the appellate level demonstrates
anew that the law is uncertain. Competing lines of authority are ripe
for recombination. Yet change is compatible with reliance and social
ordering because the pattern and general direction of the movement
can be grasped. Like cases need not and often should not be treated
alike in that a similar decision is reached: like cases must merely be
treated with like process. As part of that process, the Supreme Court
must ask whether the similarity between the case at bar and like past
cases is such that a similar result should be reached in light of presently
applicable and desirable policies.
Stare decisis is frequently thought to be important in that it furnishes
41. See note 35 supra.
42. For a discussion of the traditional view of the concept of treating like cases alike, see
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958); Win-
ston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1974).
43. Radin, The Trail of the Ca#f, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 137, 139 (1946).
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a fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate
and reexamine every relevant issue in every case. It is in fact a store-
house of past experience which is not to be lightly discarded. The issue
of when, and under what circumstances, the Supreme Court should re-
examine the fundamental value of a rule is thus a crucial one. At least
four factors come into play here: (1) What has the incremental, serial
and remedial history of the precedent in question revealed? (2) Have
conditions changed to an extent that the premises of the decision have
been significantly affected? (3) Was the data which was available to
previous decision makers adequate to formulate the principle evolved?
(4) What is the cost of reexamination?
The final factor, which is implicit in the first four, concerns whether
or not members of the Court intuitively sense that the instant case
presents a proper occasion to reaffirm or reject the validity of a tradi-
tional legal principle in light of present policy. Periodic reexamination
which results in continued judicial imprimatur may be just as impor-
tant as reformulation or rejection because such decisions reconfirm our
belief that long-established doctrines are capable of continued vitality
in the modem context.
When the Court is faced with the decision whether to reject or reaf-
firm a given legal principle, it must consider the notion of "judicial
capital." Within a specified time period the Supreme Court might be
seen as accumulating or possessing a certain amount of capital which is
a reflection of its ability to have its decisions accepted by the public and
by other branches of government. This capital may be spent wisely or
foolishly in formulating and effectuating social policy through law.
Supreme Court decision making should proceed with the under-
standing that the very nature of the judicial process tends to conserve
judicial capital.44 An adaptive system which proceeds in small steps
and is continuous and remedial maximizes the chance that its decisions
will be accepted without precipitating a crisis of confidence or legiti-
44. Notions of judicial capital may be in part responsible for the Court's reluctance to
rule broadly on many constitutional issues, although the policy against overbroad rulings is
usually articulated by reference to the "case or controversy" requirement. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. What may also underlie recent Supreme Court decisions in the desegregation
area, which appear to retreat from the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S.
483 (1954), is the perception by the Court that it is the sole initiator of reform and thus
jeopardizes its legitimacy. In addition, the traditional reluctance of courts to issue orders
which they cannot effectively enforce may be responsible for the Court's recent hesitation in
the area of school desegregation. The Court may well perceive its judicial capital as being
eroded by the anomolous situation of local courts becoming responsible for the day-to-day
administration of community school systems. See note 9 supra.
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macy.45 More important, decisions by the Court need not lag behind
the perceived attitudes of the community.46 The exploratory and
recombinatorial capability of the judicial process often will result in a
decision which drags community values along with it rather than fol-
lowing at a respectful three paces.47 In such cases the drain on judicial
capital often can be tempered by the integrity of the Court's opinion
and by the extent to which time, experience and subsequent cases re-
veal its wisdom.
The judicial process can be viewed as a way of storing, retrieving and
recombining information. Indeed, the system of precedent may be one
of the most potentially creative systems of organizing and reusing in-
formation ever devised. The combinatorial and exploratory effective-
ness of the judicial process, however, depends upon the value of each
unit of information going into it. The unit of information upon which
the system of precedent is built is the decided case. Effective recombi-
nation for creative decision making necessarily assumes the worth of
the individual opinion. Thus, courts, and in particular the Supreme
Court, must tell us why they have decided as they have. This not only
means that the Court must clearly set forth the basis for decision, it also
requires the Court to squarely confront past precedent and explain why
it has decided to follow or depart from prior decisions. Moreover, the
Court must look forward to and anticipate the impact of continuing or
departing from precedent in light of contemporary understanding.
Failure to expressly and specifically justify a decision irreparably dam-
ages the system of precedent 48 because succeeding judges do not have
45. Robert Dahl asserts that "ITIhe policy views dominant on the Court are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States." Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
46. While legislatures are sometimes paralyzed in the face of controversial, politically
sensitive issues, the courts' insulation from direct accountability to the electorate often al-
lows them to take action to remedy pressing social ills when the legislature has been unable
to act. As Robert Bork has observed, the legislature, itself, may often be guilty of conni-
vance in this result: "Rather than making the tough choices, legislatures will frequently write
a vague law, and pass [the hard decisions] off on the courts." Robert Bork, quoted in
Thomas, TIME, January 22, 1979, at 91, 92 (Essay). Such legislative abdications place an
inordinate burden upon Supreme Court decision making. See note 67 infra.
47. One example of such a decision might be Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(establishing indigent criminal defendant's right to counsel in felony trials).
48. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Mr. Justice Douglas did purport to
explain his decision. However, it appears that the Court may have been less than frank in its
opinion. Compare the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, id. at 486. Some of the
analytical problems that have been encountered in cases following Griswold seem to stem
from this lack of frank explanation. For instance, although Griswold relied largely upon
marital privacy, the named plaintiff in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) was an unmarried
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the benefit of what judicial decision making at its best can offer: an
agonizing struggle to use the accumulated wisdom of the past in light of
contemporary understanding to do essential justice to the parties at bar
while anticipating the results of a rule of general application.49 Viewed
in this context, there is no more important duty than to fully set forth
the basis for the Court's decision. The integrity of judicial history is at
stake in each and every decision.5"
To the extent that prior decisions honestly report the basis for deci-
woman seeking an abortion. Similarly, although Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
was decided on equal protection grounds, it owes a clear debt to Griswold. In Eisenstadt the
Court struck down a law prohibiting, inter alia, the distribution of contraceptives to unmar-
ried women. In Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), a deeply divided
Court extended the principles of Griswold and Eisenstadt to invalidate state laws prohibiting
the sale of contraceptives to minors under 16 years of age. Yet, the Court summarily af-
firmed a law which was claimed to invade the consensual privacy of Virginia homosexuals
in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The district court decision in that
case, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), had relied strongly on the assumption that the
Griswold line of cases was limited to privacy related to marriage and family life. Yet, the
Court apparently did not feel it necessary to clarify any inconsistencies that affirmance of
the district court decision might have suggested. The result of this series of cases is a doe-
trine of privacy whose parameters seem hopelessly unclear. Greater clarity, explanation and
frankness in Griswold might well have helped to produce a more consistent, understandable
and analytically justifiable result. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (where the
deep division among members of the Court made it almost impossible to ascertain a rule of
decision in the case; consequently, decisions purporting to follow Furman have demon-
strated acute confusion).
49. In a recent keynote address, Max Lerner discussed various models which have been
used to advance our understanding of Supreme Court decision making. Rather than deter-
minism, behaviorism or other models, Mr. Lerner found the greatest utility in what he
termed the "organismic" model of constitutional history. This model views the judicial
branch as a living, dynamic, evolving and sometimes decaying institution. The term "holis-
tic" was not used because, while it suggests consideration of the total organism, it fails to
point to an "integrating principle." Keynote Address by Max Lemer, First West Coast Con-
ference on Constitutional Law (Sept. 17, 1977). Under the view of judicial decision making
set forth in this article, the integrating principle is the integrity of the struggle or process by
which the Court uses the accumulated wisdom of the past in light of contemporary under-
standing to do essential justice to the parties at bar while anticipating the results of a rule of
general application.
50. There is no way to overstate the importance of viewing the judicial system as one
which stores, reflects and preserves our history. Judges and those practicing law bear re-
sponsibility for its accuracy and integrity. Cf. A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPEL-
AGO Two (1975) (emphasizing that it is of the utmost importance that the integrity of history
be preserved and that persons with firsthand knowledge of historical events assume respon-
sibility for that preservation).
Failure to sufficiently explain and justify has also left the Court open to accusations of
"selective activism," which recent critics of the Court have defined as activism which "de-
pends on whether or not [the Court] likes the result." Thomas, TIME, January 22, 1979, at
91, 92 (Essay) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) as a possible example of selec-
tive activism). These types of criticism demonstrate how a lack of clear rationalization can
damage the Court's appearance of integrity and impartiality. See generally note 48 supra.
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sion, subsequent decisions are left little room to base analysis upon nar-
row concerns, special interests or ideas which experience has laid to
rest. The right to decide depends upon the duty to explain. Failure to
do so fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the Supreme Court
in deciding the questions which deeply affect and divide us.
Recent decisions, including abortion cases,5 and first amendment
cases involving the media,52 have necessitated that those seeking to jus-
tify judicial involvement in the solution of complex problems answer
questions even more difficult than those posed at the beginning of this
article. Added to the difficulty of justifying such decision making by
nine electorally irresponsible men is the problem of nine such men de-
ciding important questions based on information received wholly in-
dependent of the record. The Blackstonian conception of judicial
decision making based on information made part of the record below
no longer accounts for what, in fact, happens in the Supreme Court.
Facts which have come to the Court's attention through means other
than the traditional methods of pleading and proof have often been
critically important to decisions of the Court.5 These "legislative
facts"54 are not generated by the adversary system. Instead, they are
products of inquiring judicial minds.5 Yet, since these facts are extrin-
sic to the parties' pleadings and argument, their underlying assump-
tions and accuracy are not subjected to the probing and scrutiny which
the adversary system can provide.
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to confine itself to strictly "adju-
dicative facts"5 6 is readily understandable. The adversary system has
serious shortcomings. It assumes both that the parties will have equal
legal resources and that they will bring to the Court's attention all per-
tinent information. Stare decisis itself has played a role in the Court's
51. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. See Miller and Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System, And The Flow Of
Information To The Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1193 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Miller].
54. "Legislative facts" are facts that come to the Court's attention through means other
than the traditional methods of pleading and proof. For instance, they may be facts which
did not appear in the parties' pleadings, but which the Court, sua sponte, deemed relevant.
See id. at 1233-35.
55. Id. at 1187-89, 1192. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where Mr. Justice
Blackmun established the "trimester" system for dealing with the problem of abortion, al-
though it appears that the parties never mentioned "trimesters" in the pleadings. Miller,
supra note 53, at 1187-97.
56. "Adjudicative facts" is a term utilized to describe facts which are part of the parties'
own pleadings. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 53, at 1193-99.
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departure from "adjudicative facts," for it can be argued that the bind-
ing national precedential effect of the Court's decisions should not be
made to depend upon a poorly pleaded or argued case. However, the
problem remains. What answer is there to the criticism that, when the
Court deems it appropriate, a private litigant can get what Congress
and the President cannot obtain: an advisory opinion?5 7 In certain
cases, the "legislative facts" relied upon can be so essential that, in ef-
fect, the lawsuit is retried at the appellate level, without the benefit of a
hearing or of any of the due process safeguards designed to ferret out
tenuous assumptions, faulty reasoning and unexamined bias.
The answer is not to purport to require the Supreme Court to refrain
from considering "legislative facts." Such a limitation on the Court is
neither possible nor desirable. If an opinion is to be a storehouse of
current knowledge and wisdom, Justice Traynor's admonition must be
heeded; the Supreme Court justice must be willing to plunge himself or
herself into other disciplines to the extent his or her knowledge and
sense of propriety allow.5" No effort should be spared to muster every
bit of information available which speaks to the case at hand. 9' Any
disadvantages inherent in the use of "legislative facts" can be overcome
by scrupulous adherence to the judicial process itself as set forth in this
article. That is, the Court must undertake to deal directly and ex-
pressly with lines of competing past precedent and set forth exactly why
that precedent should not control in light of the Court's contemporary
understanding, whether that be fed by "legislative facts" or "adjudica-
tive facts." In addition, the Court must undertake to expressly antici-
pate the impact of its decision beyond the case at bar. Most important,
the Court must have the courage to set forth the presence of any "legis-
lative facts" and the relationship such facts have to the Court's deci-
sion. After this has been done, the process of subsequent cases
adjudicating similar controversies will then act upon and test the truth,
accuracy and wisdom of the facts which were vital to'the Court's deci-
sion.
The justices must also, themselves, be aware of the enormous capac-
ity of the judicial system to attack complex public problems with inno-
vative solutions. Unless those making the decisions understand this
57. Id. at 1196. The abortion decisions, along with other types of cases, are said to consti-
tute "advisory opinions" because the holdings go far beyond the issues relevant to the indi-
vidual litigants. See id. at 1193.
58. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 750 (1970).
59. One of Mr. Justice Douglas' great strengths was his ability to use empirical data and
social science findings to demonstrate how disadvantaged the poor in fact are in the United
States. Dorsen, Equal Protection Of The Laws, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 357, 361 (1974).
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potential, the system will not serve as a source of continuing solutions
to public problems." Justices should view prior decisions as competing
lines of authority to be tested in light of contemporary understanding.6'
Cases should be seen as opportunities inviting exploratory responses,
attempts to solve problems as imaginatively as is compatible with being
fair to the public and the parties at bar. Rigid rules of stare decisis
have no place in such a system.62
The proposition that judicial decision making is capable of, and even
peculiarly well adapted to, attacking complex problems of public pol-
icy, rests, in large part, upon the assumption that one can be reasonably
confident that what one decision neglects, a subsequent decision will
correct. Thus, while a particular decision may be "interstitial," the ju-
dicial process is not. The error of those maintaining that the courts are
not suited to pass on complex public problems is in focusing upon a
single decision when, in fact, that one decision is merely a link in an
evolutionary chain.
In order, however, for issues to be refined and errors corrected, the
people affected by such issues and errors must have access to the courts.
The incremental, serial, continuous and remedial process which justi-
fies judicial treatment of complex public problems cannot go forward
unless those who are aggrieved have such access. 63 Even more than the
failure to explain, the appalling lack of effective legal representation for
millions of people undermines the ability of, and justification for, the
60. In the words of Justice Traynor:
At the slightest sign that judge-made law may move forward these bogus defenders of
stare decisis conjure up mythical dangers to alarm the citizenry. They do sly injury to
the law when the public takes them seriously and timid judges retreat from painstaking
analysis within their already great constraints to safe and unsound repetitions of magic
words from the legal lore of the year before much too long ago.
Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 621 (1961).
61. For an interesting discussion of how justices of the Court during the Warren years
viewed the weight that should be given to stare decisis, see Noland, Stare Decisis and the
Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the Warren Years, 4 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 101 (1969).
62. Recognizing the creative potential of the judicial process speaks to the resolution of
the debate between Goodhart and Stone. Compare Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1959) with Stone, The Ratio ofthe Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD.
L. REV. 597 (1959). The innovative model of judicial decision making under consideration
supports Stone's position. Stare decisis cannot be understood to lay down definitive rules of
prescription and prohibition. Rather, the system of stare decisis is geared to increase the
range of competing versions available in rough proportion to the importance of the point of
law. The notion of the ratio decidendi of a case, rather than an emphasis upon the binding
effect of each step in the analysis, "is almost a perfect medium for the creation of multiple
and competing references." Stone, supra, at 619.
63. Since access, almost by definition, starts with lower courts, the responsibility to assure
access to litigants must rest with those lower courts as well as with the Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court to decide important questions of public policy.
64
III. CONCLUSION
The judicial system possesses a unique capability to deal creatively
and effectively with disputes presenting complex problems of public
policy.65 It does not follow, however, that the essential function of the
Supreme Court is to resolve such problems or that the Court is better
able to address them than the other coordinate branches of government
or even the private sector.6 6 Supreme Court decision making cannot
operate effectively in the face of abdication of decision making respon-
sibility by the legislative and executive branches of government at all
levels and by private citizens and organizations.67
The essential function of the Court may be, as Alexander Bickel has
suggested, not so much the final resolution of complex problems about
which there is intense conflict, but rather, the preservation of the diffu-
sion, separation and balance of power, both intragovernmental and be-
64. A substantial segment of our citizens remain unable to obtain legal services. One
recent study concludes that while over 10% of the population meets the rather stringent
eligibility requirements for public legal assistance, existing programs can handle only about
1/7 of the need. Moreover, another large segment of the public, while not eligible for ex-
isting programs, cannot realistically afford legal assistance. One recent estimate goes so far
as to suggest that possibly 4 of every 5 persons cannot afford lawyers for their routine legal
problems. Manning, Opening Statement, 4 LITIGATION, Winter 1978, at I (Journal Of The
Section Of Litigation Am. Bar Ass'n).
65. But see Rabin, Dealing with Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal
System, 30 STAN. L. REv. 281, 298 (1978) in which the author argues that, when confronted
with an unprecedented occurrence, administrative and judicial systems are less effective than
other bodies.
66. The private sector has, in fact, produced many innovative alternatives to the tradi-
tional adjudicatory process. See, e.g., Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation.-
An Alternative Approach, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978).
67. In a famous passage, Learned Hand expressed the fundamental dependence of judi-
cial decision making upon the assumption of responsibility by other institutions and mem-
bers of society:
You may ask what then will become of the fundamental principles of equity and fair
play which our constitution enshrines and whether I seriously believe that unsupported
they will serve merely as counsels of moderation. I do not think that anyone can say
what will be left of those principles; I do not know whether they will serve only as
ounsels; but this I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation
is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save;
that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture
of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.
L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 181 (I. Dillard ed. 1952) (address by
Learned Hand at 250th anniversary of founding of Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, Nov. 21, 1942). See note 46 supra. With regard to the importance of private individu-
als acting in the public interest, see Oldham, Book Review, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 341
(1978) (R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976)).
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tween government and the private sector.6" The performance of this
function upholds and defines the very structure supporting our basic
freedoms. Where the structural lines are drawn is critical to how com-
plex public problems will be resolved, and by whom. The issues faced
by the Supreme Court in performing this function are enormously diffi-
cult.
69
68. Alexander Bickel, The Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open First Amendment, Califor-
nia Continuing Education of the Bar Tape (Sept. 1972) [hereinafter cited as The Uninhibited
First Amendment]. Alexander Bickel puts it so well:
Madison knew the secret of this disorderly system, indeed, he invented it. The secret is
the separation and balance of powers. Men's ambition [is] joined to the requirements of
their office so that they push those requirements to the limit which, in turn, is set by the
contrary requirements of another office joined to the ambition of other men. This is not
an arrangement whose justification is efficiency, logic or clarity. Its justification is that
it accommodates power to freedom and vice versa: it reconciles the irreconcilable.
Id.
69. As an example, Bickel cites the Supreme Court's resourceful efforts to cushion rather
than to resolve clashes between the first amendment and interests which conflict with it, by
using accommodations that rely upon the separation and diffusion of power. The devices
which are in most common use go by the names of vagueness and overbreadth:
The Court will not accept infringements on free speech by administrative or executive
action and if the infringement occurs pursuant to a statute, the Court will demand that
the statute express the wish of the legislature-in the clearest, most precise and narrow-
est fashion possible. Essentially, what the Court is exacting is assurance that the judg-
ment that speech should be suppressed is that of the full pluralist open political process,
not of someone down the line representing only one or another particular segment or
faction in the society, and assurance that the judgment has been made closely and
deliberately with full awareness of the consequences, and with clear focus on exactly the
kind of speech that the legislature wished to suppress.
Id. An example given by Bickel is New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971). By invoking, in appropriate circumstances, the doctrine of executive privilege, the
President can withhold documents from Congress and certainly from the public at large.
Yet under the Times case, if a newspaper had obtained such documents without itself having
participated in their theft, it could have published them with impunity; and if someone had
stolen the documents and delivered them to a United States senator, that senator could use
them and read them on the floor of the Senate and thus make them public. There would be
no recourse against him because of the immunity granted by the Constitution to members of
Congress. The paradox is that government is entitled to keep things private, but with very
few exceptions involving the highest probability of very grave consequences, it may not do
so effectively. Bickel explains that:
Members of Congress, as well as the press, may publish materials that the government
wishes to, and is entitled to, keep private. It's a disorderly situation, surely. But if we
ordered it, we would have to sacrifice one of two contending values, privacy or public
disclosure, which are ultimately irreconcilable. If we should let the government censor
as well as withhold, that would be too much dangerous power and too much privacy. If
we should allow the government neither to censor nor withhold, that would provide for
too little privacy of decision making and too much power in the press and in Congress.
So we are content with the pulling and pawing because in it lies the maximum assur-
ance of both privacy and freedom of information. Not full assurance of either, but
maximum assurance of both.
The Uninhibited First Amendment, supra note 68. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631 (1975) (exerpted from an address by Mr. Justice Stewart on November 2, 1974 at
Yale Law School).
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It is here, in connection with discharging its function to "balance"
the balance of power, that the incremental,
7" continuous, 71 remedial72
and innovative73 nature of Supreme Court decision making is most val-
uable.74 This function lies at the heart ofjudicial review. The Supreme
Court's ultimate responsibility for its discharge mandates that the
Court engage in the agonizing struggle referred to,7" explain the basis
for decision,76 identify any "legislative facts" vital to the decision,"7 and
that the Court, and others involved in the administration of justice, see
to it that citizens have continuing access to the courts.78 In other words,
the justification for judicial review arises from the unique nature of the
judicial process itself: but it does so only when that process operates at
its full potential.
When, then, is the Supreme Court justified in overturning precedent?
For all the reasons set forth in this article, the most appropriate time is
when there has been an incremental, continuous, remedial and explora-
tory history of judicial decision making. Does this leave room for a
departure from existing precedent based upon what the Court considers
to be a moral imperative,79 or for courageous and imaginative attempts
to deal with problems not adequately addressed by past precedent?
80
70. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
74. The reason that judicial decision making is potentially so well suited to discharging
this function is found in the very nature of the judicial process. Its incremental and remedial
characteristics allow change to occur in small steps, in light of past experience, so as to
preserve accumulated wisdom, while its continuous and innovative attributes create the ca-
pacity for dynamic and even revolutionary change. "Balancing" the balance of power re-
quires the most careful yet creative decision making possible.
75. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
79. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was a legitimate instance of the
Court's response to a moral imperative. Other examples might include Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 388 U.S. 663 (1966) (establishing a right to vote in state elections); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing indigent criminal defendant's right to coun-
sel in felony trials); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state law
providing for compulsory sterilization of habitual felons). But f. Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (warning that the Constitution is not designed to
promote any one social or economic theory and that judges must separate their own philo-
sophical beliefs from their interpretations of the Constitution). Compare Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) with id. at 375 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (demonstrating disagreement among members of the Court as to what does and
does not offend the collective moral conscience of American society as a whole).
80. The first attempts to demonstrate that the Constitution embodies a right of personal
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The answer is yes, because each decision starts its own chain of deci-
sions which will then explore and reveal the wisdom of that decision.
No one decision is so irreversible that it cannot be corrected by a subse-
quent decision. If the Court adheres to the requirement that its reason-
ing be explained and that its essential factual assumptions be revealed,
narrow and self-serving concerns, fuzzy thinking and all the manifesta-
tions of imperfect analysis will be exposed as such. The best protection
against abuse of judicial authority may be the sobering realization that
the chickens will come home to roost.
While writing this article, I was concerned that the view of the judi-
cial system here expressed carried with it a relativism at odds with prin-
ciple. I hope this is not the case, and that the view of the judiciary set
forth in this article, and the view which the judicial system actually
reflects, is that dogma should never stand in the way of truth and that
principle worthy of adherence must be able to withstand the most ex-
acting test of past experience, contemporary wisdom and essential jus-
tice to the parties at bar.
privacy can be viewed as such attempts. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
1979]

